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Transportation also absorbed users’
time—a valuable commodity excluded
from GDP. In 1996, travelers spent
roughly 120 billion hours in transit,and
surface and air freight absorbed 3.4 bil-
lion hours. If travelers value time at half
their hourly wage—a common assump-
tion among economists for urban com-
muters—and if shippers attach a cost of,
say, 7 percent of their shipments’ value
for each additional day spent in transit,
then transportation accounts for another
$1.2 trillion in economic activity.
Transportation is also an important
means for government to exert its
inﬂuence on the economy.Washington,
in cooperation with foreign govern-
ments, effectively regulates international
air and ocean transport. State and local
governments regulate taxis in most U.S.
cities.Local governments,with state and
federal ﬁnancial support, are quasi-
monopoly providers of urban bus and
rail transit.A federal government corpo-
ration (Amtrak) is a monopoly provider
of intercity passenger rail transport.
Most U.S. roads, bridges, airports, and
ports are owned and operated by feder-
al,state,or local governments.All modes
of transportation are subject to govern-
mental safety, pollution, and noise regu-
lations. Research and development of
new transportation and infrastructure
technologies is largely supported by the
government. Virtually the only excep-
tion to this rule of government involve-
ment is intercity rail freight, truck, and
air transport, large parts of which were
deregulated by Washington in the late
1970s and early 1980s.And even there,
Congress and the Department of
Transportation sometimes cannot seem
to leave well enough alone.
Policymakers who view the huge
transportation market as subject to a
variety of serious market failures—
economies of scale, negative spillovers
such as congestion and pollution, and
imperfect information—believe such
extensive government intervention is
necessary to correct those failures. But
others, myself included, believe the
potential market failures are exaggerated
and that the government has done more
harm than good.
In my view, the preponderance of
scholarly evidence  developed in trans-
portation economics over the past sever-
al decades leaves no question that the
government should greatly reduce its
role in all aspects of transportation. By
repeatedly failing to enact efficient poli-
cies to correct market failures and by
rigidly pursuing policies that have
undermined the efficiency of every
transportation mode and the welfare of
most users—especially those with the
lowest incomes—policymakers have
assured that pervasive government fail-
ures are compromising the performance
of the U.S. transportation sector far
more than market failures.
This is not to say that getting the
government out of transportation will
be easy and that the private sector will
perform ﬂawlessly in the transportation
market once government involvement is
curtailed.But by ridding the transporta-
tion sector of most observable govern-
ment failures and by allowing innova-
tion and state-of-the-art technology to
ﬂourish free of government interfer-
ence, the private sector can vastly
improve transportation and thereby
advance our standard of living.The only
real uncertainty is how long policymak-





cholarly journals, as well as news-
papers and magazines, are replete
with assessments of and opinions
about the effect of government policy
on transportation. The popular media
often report sharp disagreements—dis-
agreements that turn out largely to
reﬂect the views of interest groups and
ideologues.The scholarly assessments,by
contrast, have reached a consensus.
Without pretending to be exhaustive, I
G
etting goods and people to their destinations accounts for
an enormous share of U.S. economic activity. In 1996,
Americans spent roughly $600 billion commuting to work,
traveling for pleasure, and buying and operating vehicles.
Firms spent more than $500 billion shipping products to dis-
tribution centers and retail outlets, sending their employees to
meet with customers and suppliers, and buying and operating
vehicles. Local, state, and federal government spending on
transportation infrastructure and services upped the total to
$1.3 trillion or roughly 17 percent of GDP.
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will distill the scholarly evidence in
what follows. Readers wishing a more
comprehensive discussion are encour-
aged to consult the research cited.
Perhaps the earliest empirical evi-
dence of government failure came in
scholarly analysis of the economic
effects of government regulation of rail
freight, trucking, and airlines.This evi-
dence was crystallized by assessments of
rail freight, truck, and air deregulation
that showed signiﬁcant improvement in
transportation efficiency when tasks
once performed by the government
were handed over to the market.
Regulatory Policy toward
Intercity Carriers
According to the conventional argu-
ment that has prevailed for much of this
century, economic regulation of rail-
roads and airlines was supposed to
beneﬁt society because both modes
were alleged to be natural monopolies
(an unusual situation in which social
costs are minimized when one carrier
serves the market). Price regulation
would protect consumers from monop-
oly abuses, and entry and exit regula-
tion—rules governing when a carrier
could serve or leave a market—would
assure efficient and dependable service.
Trucks were never considered natural
monopolies, but at the railroads’ insis-
tence their operations were brought
under the regulatory umbrella.
Although the Interstate Commerce
Commission began regulating railroads
in 1887 and trucks in 1935 and the Civil
Aeronautics Board began regulating air-
lines in 1938, it was not until the late
1950s and 1960s that scholarly studies
began to reveal that regulation was
harming consumers. For example, in a
1965 Yale Law Journal article, Michael
Levine found that ﬂights from Boston to
Washington cost considerably more
than ﬂights—of roughly the same dis-
tance—from San Francisco to Los
Angeles.The explanation was that fares
on the interstate Boston to Washington
route were regulated by the CAB while
fares on the intrastate San Francisco to
Los Angeles route, overseen by the
California Public Utilities Commission,
were determined primarily by market
forces. Other researchers found that
truck rates for farm goods exempt from
ICC regulation were lower (on a ton-
mile basis) than rates for goods subject
to ICC regulations. Perhaps the crown-
ing blow was a 1966 article by George
FOR THE MOST PART, DEREGULATION HAS
WORKED THE SAME WAY IN EACH INDUSTRY—
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Hilton in the Journal of Law and
Economics, which ﬂatly concluded that
even railroad regulation was an inappro-
priate response to the conditions in the
late 1880s that brought it forth.
Timing, of course, is everything.
When the broad scholarly consensus on
the desirability of deregulation was
reached during the inﬂation-plagued
1970s, politicians were already on the
lookout for ways to ﬁght inﬂation.They
were happy to be handed clear evidence
of how trucking and airline deregula-
tion would simultaneously do that and
beneﬁt their constituents. Political sci-
entists Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk
argue in a 1985 Brookings book, The
Politics of Deregulation, that deregulation
would never have occurred if econo-
mists had not generally supported it
through research and participated
actively in policy debates.
Railroads, unlike trucking and air-
lines, were deregulated to keep the
industry alive and in the private sector.
By the 1970s, several major bankrupt-
cies had already forced the government
to take over part of the railroad industry
by creating Conrail, and some policy-
makers feared that the entire industry
would have to be nationalized.The 1973
report to the Council of Economic
Advisers by the Task Force on Railroad
Productivity, chaired by John R. Meyer,
showed that regulation was inhibiting
rail proﬁtability and that the industry
needed much greater pricing and oper-
ating freedom to avoid more bankrupt-
cies. That the railroad industry, unlike
the airline and trucking industries, sup-
ported deregulation also made it politi-
cally attractive.
Experience with Deregulation
Full deregulation did not happen
overnight in any sector.Cautious regula-
tory agencies tried a variety of experi-
ments and partial deregulatory actions,
including CAB liberalization of airline
entry and discount fare experiments dur-
ing the mid-1970s and ICC liberalization
of trucking and railroad rates (and rail-
road contracting with shippers) during
the late 1970s. Congress followed with
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,the
Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980,and
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Airline
fares, entry, and exit were completely
deregulated by 1983; trucking entry and
interstate rates were, in practice, com-
pletely deregulated in 1980 (intrastate
rates in 1994);railroads and shippers were
free to set contracts in 1980.
Now, some 20 years later, the results
of the deregulation experiments are in.
For the most part, deregulation has
worked the same way in each indus-
try—and even better than expected.
(For a comprehensive summary, see my
chapter with Steven A. Morrison in a
new Brookings book, Essays in
Transportation Economics and Policy: A
Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer.)
Eliminating entry barriers stimulated
competition from both incumbent ﬁrms
and new entrants. Intensiﬁed competi-
tion spurred innovations in marketing,
operations, technology, and governance
that enabled ﬁrms to become more effi-
cient, improve their service quality,
introduce new services, and become
more responsive to consumers’ prefer-
ences.The railroad industry got back on
its feet,becoming much more proﬁtable
than it had been under regulation. But
in the end,consumers gained the most.
Air travelers, enjoying a 33 percent
decline in real average fares, as well as
greater service frequency, have reaped
annual net beneﬁts of nearly $20 billion
(1996 dollars). Truck and rail shippers’
annual beneﬁts—primarily a 35–75 per-
cent decline in real average rates and
faster and more reliable service—
amount to nearly $30 billion.And these
beneﬁts have been achieved with con-
tinued improvements in safety.
Who lost from deregulation? Labor’s
experience was mixed. Truck drivers’
wages fell, but rail and airline workers’
wages held ﬁrm on average. Rail
employment fell, but airline and truck-
ing employment rose.For the most part,
labor opposed deregulation—rightly for
its own interest—but its losses are at
most a small fraction of consumers’
gains.As noted,rail proﬁts increased and
airline proﬁts, though volatile, on aver-
age also rose, while truckers’ proﬁts
declined.Probably the most vocal critics
of deregulation are the minority of trav-
elers and shippers who, often temporar-
ily and for idiosyncratic reasons, face
very high prices and receive poor ser-
vice.To be sure,long-distance air travel-
ers on busy routes have beneﬁted more
than short-distance travelers on less-
traveled routes, and large rail and truck
shippers have gained more than their
small counterparts.But the unequal dis-
tribution of beneﬁts generally has had a
rational basis. For example, roughly 90
percent of the difference between the
gains of air travelers on busy routes and
those on less-traveled routes is attribut-
able to the higher costs of serving the
latter routes,where smaller planes have a
higher cost per seat-mile and ﬂy with a
smaller share of their seats ﬁlled.
The central point here is what dereg-
ulation’s accomplishments teach us
about government failure in transporta-
tion. Deregulation succeeded because
ﬁrms were allowed and encouraged to
respond to market forces by becoming
more efficient and innovative. The
intensity of competition unleashed
among incumbent carriers and new
entrants in each industry was unexpect-
ed. Other surprises included airlines’
accelerated development of hub-and-
spoke route structures to increase ﬂight
frequency; railroads’ use of combined
train-truck systems and double stack
trains to improve service; and truckers’
development of high-service megacarri-
ers that even attracted business from
shippers accustomed to providing their
own trucking service. The problem in
intercity transportation was not market
failure but government failure. By sup-
pressing competition, regulation had
suppressed innovation and hurt con-
sumers in ways that could be fully




cholars have also developed evi-
dence of government failure in reg-
ulating international transportation
and taxis, providing urban transit and
intercity rail passenger transportation,
managing roads and airports, addressing
transportation spillovers,and investing in
transportation R&D.Although this evi-
dence argues for additional deregulation
or privatization that would enable the40 BROOKINGS REVIEW
private sector to improve transportation
efficiency, policymakers have largely
resisted change that would fully expose
their failures in these areas.
International Transportation
Washington intervened in internation-
al air travel and ocean shipping several
decades ago, not because of market
failure but because of international
disputes.The result, however, has been
the same:government failure.
Today bilateral government treaties
control air service between the United
States and a foreign country. In most
cases, these treaties restrict carriers’
freedom to set fares and service fre-
quency. Fares are roughly 30 percent
higher than they would be in a dereg-
ulated market—even higher in more
heavily regulated Asian-U.S.markets—
and service frequency has been cur-
tailed. Federal regulations also prevent
foreign carriers from serving U.S.
domestic routes. Although some U.S.
officials advocate so-called Open Skies
agreements that let market forces
determine international fares and ser-
vice, few support opening the domes-
tic market to foreign carriers.
Government negotiators are sensitive
to U.S.carriers’complaints that foreign
carriers are subsidized by their home
governments and that the huge U.S.
market offers foreign carriers more
potential passengers than foreign mar-
kets offer U.S.carriers.
Unable to serve more markets
abroad, U.S. air carriers have increased
their presence there by entering into
marketing alliances with and buying
partial ownership of foreign carriers.
U.S. carriers whose foreign partners
have signed Open Skies agreements
acquire antitrust immunity, which, of
course, undercuts the competition
encouraged by Open Skies.
American consumers would beneﬁt
if carriers focused solely on improving
the quality and efficiency of their
international operations. But the
remaining regulatory regime encour-
ages carriers to engage in repeated
games with the government to maxi-
mize access to foreign routes while
fending off competition.
In ocean shipping,rates and capaci-
ty are jointly determined by carriers
themselves in government-sanctioned
cartels, called “conferences.” (A few
smaller independent carriers choose to
set rates outside the conference pro-
ceedings but must ﬁle them with the
Federal Maritime Commission.) Rates
are more than 20 percent higher than
they would be in a competitive mar-
ket, and service has been temporarily
halted to some U.S. ports.As in inter-
national air transport, U.S. carriers
have used the regulatory arena to seek
protection from competitors while
expanding their markets through
global alliances. Government restricts
operations in other ways, too. U.S.
ocean carriers face curtailed competi-
tion from international air cargo
because the latter is governed by bilat-
eral treaties. And the 1920 Jones Act
requires domestic shippers of water-
borne freight to use U.S. carriers.
Even in the post-NAFTA era,
Canadian and Mexican carriers can-
not move freight between U.S.ports.
Taxis
Closer to home, taxi fares and entry
are subject to regulation by state or
local governments in most urban
areas. It appears that taxis were origi-
nally brought under regulation in
major cities during the Depression
simply to limit the number of licensed
operators and ensure minimum
proﬁtability. But taxis are not natural
monopolies, so, as in the case for
trucks, regulation has primarily pro-
tected them from competition rather
than beneﬁting consumers.For exam-
ple, taxis often use the regulatory
process to keep vans and limousines
from serving airports. Deregulating
taxis is not without controversy, how-
ever. Roughly 20 U.S. cities have
tried it; some have seen fares fall and
service improve; others have seen 
the opposite. Taxi deregulation is 
most likely to succeed as part of 
a broader strategy to stimulate com-
petition in all modes of urban trans-
port. Unfortunately, taxi’s main com-





has bafﬂed economists by con-
sistently undermining the very
public interest it was supposed to pro-
mote. One of the best examples of reg-
ulatory failure is its suppression of
innovation in the railroad industry. As
described by Robert Gallamore in his
chapter in Essays in Transportation
Economics and Policy, during the early
1960s railroads were exploring ways to
develop more specialized freight cars
to lower operating expenses. To
exploit the innovation, a railroad
might need to induce volume by low-
ering rates for the intended traffic.
But when Southern Railway tried 
to use incentive pricing to introduce
“Big John” aluminum grain cars, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission
disallowed the rate for violating 
minimum rate regulations—thus pro-
tecting barge operators and other 
railroads while delaying innovation in
an industry that sorely needed it. 
Even a deregulated industry is not
safe from regulation’s pernicious
effects. The Department of
Transportation, for example, claims to
want more competition in the deregu-
lated airline industry, but the cumula-
tive actions of its own agency, the
Federal Aviation Administration, are
restricting competition. FAA perimeter
rules prohibit long-distance ﬂights to
or from Washington’s Reagan National
and New York’s La Guardia airports.
Slot controls limit the number of take-
offs and landings per hour at La
Guardia, National, Kennedy, and
Chicago O’Hare. The FAA’s inefficient
and outdated technology prevents
carriers from expanding their opera-
tions because it constrains airport and
air space capacity. And by suspending
ValuJet after initially defending it in
the wake of a 1996 crash in the
Florida Everglades, the FAA appeased
the media but set back the reputation
of all start-up carriers. With allies like
that, who needs enemies?SUMMER 1999 41
Urban Transit
Fifty years ago most urban transit was
privately provided. During the early
1960s, with the ﬁnancial condition of
private transit companies deteriorating
badly and with big city mayors arguing
that subsidizing urban transit would be
more cost-effective than building high-
ways,Congress agreed to help cities buy
their transit companies. Federal operat-
ing subsidies followed in the 1970s.
Today, most operating assistance comes
from state and local governments while
Washington shoulders most capital
investment.
But despite huge federal, state, and
local subsidies, transit’s share of all trips
in large urban areas has fallen from more
than 20 percent in 1960 to less than 10
percent today.And transit’s high share of
empty seats attests to its inefficient oper-
ations. In the mid-1990s rail ﬁlled
roughly 18 percent of its seats with pay-
ing customers,buses roughly 14 percent.
Transit deﬁcits are a serious drain on
the public purse.By 1995,the U.S.pub-
lic transit operating deﬁcit approached
$9 billion annually. Continuing capital
investments swelled this deﬁcit further.
And here, as everywhere in transporta-
tion, government involvement portends
better things for special interests than for
travelers. It has been estimated that as
much as 75 percent of federal spending
on mass transit goes to transit workers
(as above-market wages) or to suppliers
of transit capital equipment (as proﬁts
and interest). Just 25 percent goes to
improve service and reduce fares.
Deﬁcits can be economically justiﬁed if
they are less than the beneﬁts provided
by the subsidized service. But in our
1998 Brookings book, Alternate Route:
Toward Efficient Urban Transportation,
Chad Shirley and I found that the
beneﬁts provided by bus to urban travel-
ers in the United States were well below
its subsidies and that the beneﬁts provid-
ed by rail just equaled its subsidies.
One reason for the public transit
deﬁcits is that policymakers set fares far
below the cost of service. Shirley and I
showed that an efficient policy—charg-
ing travelers for the cost of their trips
and sharply curtailing service to the
point where the added beneﬁts equaled
the added costs—would eliminate these
deﬁcits and enable transit operations to
produce positive social beneﬁts.
A second reason for the deficits is
that public bus and rail companies fail
to keep down costs.The large share of
empty bus and subway seats is one indi-
cator that costs are too high.Others are
excessive wages (the typical
Washington, D.C., Metrobus driver, for
example,gets paid twice as much as dri-
vers for the handful of private bus com-
panies in the D.C. area) and declining
productivity.According to Charles Lave,
in a 1991 paper in Transportation
Planning and Technology, transit produc-
tivity has fallen 40 percent since the
public takeovers in the mid-1960s.
When intercity deregulation revived
air, rail, and truck competition, carriers
adjusted operations and developed new
services to respond to customer prefer-
BAD RAIL TIMING. Transit’s inefficiencies are well known, but they can appear even worse because of bad
timing. While this paper was being written, the Washington, D.C., Metrorail’s electronic relay system experienced several
malfunctions that forced Metro to switch to manual operations. These operations, in turn, led to several breakdowns dur-
ing cherry blossom season, a peak period for Metro ridership because of an inﬂux of tourists. The widespread Metro bash-
ing that followed coincidentally occurred when the president and a vice-president of the company that manufactured
Metro’s electronic relays were sentenced for taking kickbacks from a subcontractor—for work done on other rail systems.42 BROOKINGS REVIEW
ences.But transit companies,not partic-
ularly concerned about competition,
appear heedless to travelers’ preferences.
Their high share of empty seats reﬂects
not only operating inefficiencies but
also insufficient demand for current ser-
vice even at subsidized prices. Bus and
rail operations have generally failed to
respond to socioeconomic and demo-
graphic changes that offer more rider-
ship. They have not, for example,
expanded service from inner cities to
suburban areas where job opportunities
are growing. And they have been
painfully slow to introduce new tech-
nologies, such as real-time, demand-
responsive services, or minibus opera-
tions that could beneﬁt travelers.
It might be possible to overlook all
these inefficiencies if the value of tran-
sit’s service to the elderly and poor
exceeded their ﬁnancial contribution to
transit. But it probably doesn’t.
According to recent evidence, the
mobility of the elderly depends little on
public transit. And not only has public
transit failed to connect lower-income
inner-city residents with new jobs in the
suburbs, the new routes it has created
mainly serve well-heeled commuting
professionals heading toward the central
business district—and are ﬁnanced by
taxes that fall disproportionately on the
poor. With the average annual house-
hold income of bus commuters
approaching $40,000 and that of rail
commuters approaching $50,000, the
poor are hardly transit’s primary
beneﬁciaries. Indeed, urban transit’s
ﬁnancing and service inequities are
probably one of government’s least rec-
ognized failures.
Intercity Passenger Rail
Spurred by the 1970 bankruptcy of
Penn Central, Congress created the
National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration as a for-proﬁt, quasi-public
enterprise to provide intercity rail pas-
senger service.Amtrak, as the corpora-
tion has come to be known, has always
relied on federal subsidies to defray
operating and capital expenses. In a
1990 article in the Journal of Law and
Economics, Steven A. Morrison found
that Amtrak’s value to travelers falls
short of its subsidies on almost all routes
except those in the well-traveled
Northeast corridor.
Unlike deregulated rail freight carri-
ers, which improved efficiency by aban-
doning unproﬁtable routes, Amtrak
rarely abandons even socially undesirable
ones.Amtrak is hoping to spur rail travel
by investing in faster trains, not only in
the Northeast corridor but nationwide,
but its low ridership in most parts of the
country makes large social returns on
these investments unlikely.
Infrastructure Mismanagement 
At an estimated value of roughly a tril-
lion dollars,transportation infrastructure
is America’s largest civilian public
investment.Federal,state,and local gov-
ernments share responsibility for ﬁnanc-
ing, building, and maintaining the
nation’s roads, bridges, airports, and
ports.Their huge investment has been a
boon to travelers and shippers,but waste
and deteriorating quality are today evi-
dent everywhere.
The heart of the problem, as with
public transit, is a mismatch between
prices and costs.The costs of road use
include congestion, which is caused by
all types of vehicles, and road damage
and bridge wear, which are caused by
trucks only.The gasoline tax is used as a
rough charge for all those costs but in
fact bears little relationship to them.
Costs could be covered much more
effectively by charging users for the par-
ticular costs they incur. Congestion
costs, for example, depend on the time
of day motorists travel and the roads
they use. Thus, motorists should pay a
congestion toll—assessed electronically
to avoid long lines—based on the cost
of the delay they impose on others.
Road damage depends on a truck’s
weight per axle (the more axles a truck
has for a given load, the less pavement
damage) and should be covered by a
user charge per mile based on axle
weight. Bridge wear, which depends
solely on vehicle weight,should be cov-
ered by a user charge based on weight.
The same disjunction between prices
and costs affects airports and ports.
Airport landing fees are based on an air-
craft’s weight: a commercial jumbo jet
pays considerably more to land during a
given hour than a small private plane.
But the principal cost of an aircraft take-
off or landing is the delay it causes other
aircraft, which depends on the time of
day it happens and on the airport’s
capacity. (Generally, the delay from a
takeoff or landing by a small private
plane is roughly the same as that from a
takeoff or landing by a commercial jet.)
All aircraft should pay an efﬁcient take-
off and landing congestion toll based on
the cost of the delay they impose on
other aircraft. In the case of ports, user
fees are generally held below the costs of
servicing a vessel to encourage greater
port use. With less than 40 percent of
their total ﬁnancing coming from rev-
enues, ports require large government
subsidies, which could be cut substan-
tially by cost-based charges.
Besides being mispriced, roads, air-
ports, and ports have been incorrectly
built. Road pavements, recent research
has discovered, are too thin. Thicker
pavement would hold up better under
heavy truck use and require far less
maintenance. And airports have been
underbuilt. Optimal investment calls for
many more runways at congested air-
ports or,when this is not feasible,the use
of capacity-enhancing technology, such
as ground-positioning satellites, to help
controllers manage traffic ﬂow more
effectively. Port facilities, by contrast,
generally suffer from excess capacity,and
much port capital is outdated.
Replacing current pricing of and
investment in roads, airports, and ports
with optimal pricing and investment
would speed motorists’and air travelers’
trips, lower highway maintenance costs
and aircraft operating costs, and elimi-
nate port subsidies.Total annual beneﬁts
would approach $30 billion (for details
see my 1991 article in the Journal of
Economic Perspectives).
Government management of new
infrastructure investments is also a prob-
lem.Although private managers are free
to choose the contractor with the best
combination of quality and cost, public
agencies must choose the lowest-cost
bidder.To prevent contractors from sub-
stituting inferior materials and construc-
tion techniques, public agencies writeSUMMER 1999 43
minutely detailed speciﬁcations, thus
encouraging contractors to adhere 
to the letter of the contract rather than
to seek higher-quality, efficient alterna-
tives. And because the government 
cannot always keep up with the latest
technologies,some infrastructure invest-
ments need upgrading almost as soon as
they are complete. Legislatures tend to
encourage inefficiency by ignoring
cost-beneﬁt analysis when authorizing
spending.When they do use such analy-
sis, they often overestimate future
demand and underestimate costs.
Federal legislators load transportation
bills with demonstration or pork barrel
projects to ensure passage (the 1998
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century is larded with some $9 billion
of pork). State and city officials tend to
prefer investments that entail a large fed-
eral contribution over those that could
yield greater social beneﬁts. In fact, the
highway laws of several states direct offi-
cials to select projects to maximize the
use of federal funds.
In short, government’s failure to
make the most efficient use of its trans-
portation infrastructure investment and
to get the highest return from additions
to it has substantially elevated the
nation’s transportation bill.
Transportation Spillovers
One form of market failure addressed by
government is socially costly spillovers
such as congestion, noise, pollution, and
accidents. How well has government
handled these problems?
Let’s start with congestion. Though
government has (sometimes feverishly)
built new roads (which almost immedi-
ately ﬁll up with cars) and overspent on
mass transit partly to lure people from
their cars, it has not implemented effi-
cient policies (such as tolls) to reduce
congestion. Left to their own devices,
urban commuters have avoided conges-
tion by living closer to work, using
(heavily subsidized) public transit, com-
muting during off-peak travel periods,
and so on.
The federal government has
addressed noise,pollution,and safety,but
often without considering how the
market responds to such transportation
spillovers and how to maximize social
beneﬁts.For example,aircraft noise stan-
dards set by the Federal Aviation
Administration have done more eco-
nomic harm than good. In a forthcom-
ing Journal of Law and Economics paper,
Steven A. Morrison,Tara Watson, and I
show that the noise standards, which
forced airlines to replace planes prema-
turely, generated far more costs to air-
lines and travelers than beneﬁts to
homeowners.But even an optimal noise
policy—one that relies on noise taxes or
surcharges to encourage airlines to ﬁnd
their own ways to lower noise levels—
would produce very small beneﬁts, in
part because the cost to airlines of low-
ering noise is still greater than the
beneﬁt to those homeowners who have
a high enough tolerance for noise to be
willing to live closer to a ﬂight path.
Pollution is one area where govern-44 BROOKINGS REVIEW
ment regulation has produced beneﬁts,
but even there, government could have
done better. Instead of saddling auto
manufacturers and oil companies with
costly technology and product man-
dates, government could have achieved
comparable results at less cost with a
pollution tax that encouraged people
both to drive less and to buy cars that
emit less pollution.
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards were originally set by
Washington during the early 1970s to
increase the fuel economy
of new cars and potentially
reduce pollution.In a 1992
article in the Journal of
Economic Perspectives,
Robert Crandall conclud-
ed that the standards often
failed to improve on the
market’s ability to induce
consumers to purchase fuel
efficient cars. They also
produced negative net
beneﬁts because they raised
vehicle prices and created
unintended costs—smaller,
less safe cars that were dri-
ven more.
Buses and electric vehi-
cles have also been touted
as ways to reduce auto
emissions. But buses, as
Chad Shirley and I showed
in Alternate Route,h a v e
done little to improve
urban air quality because of
their low ridership and
their diesel particulate
emissions, which are more
harmful than auto emis-
sions.And electric vehicles, as noted by
Robert Leone in his chapter in Essays in
Transportation Economics and Policy, fail a
social cost-beneﬁt test because current
technology is costly and has little impact
on the environment.The vehicles them-
selves may have no harmful emissions,
but the power plants that generate their
electricity do, and discarded electric
vehicle batteries may also damage the
environment.
How about transportation safety? Ian
Savage concludes, in his chapter in
Essays in Transportation Economics and
Policy, that the transportation product
market may,in theory,fall short on safe-
ty. But has government policy helped
address the problem?
Automobiles’ earliest safety 
features—headlights, brakelights,
emergency brakes, windshields, and
headlight dimmers—were introduced
by automakers without any govern-
ment pressure. Over the years autos
have become increasingly safe because
of improved visibility, handling,
brakes, reliability, and body structures.
Automakers have
needed to be con-
vinced that their (often
substantial) investments
in vehicle safety will be
recouped—that con-
sumers value and 
are thus willing to pay
for them. But once
convinced, they have
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panel, and dual braking
systems, even though
market acceptance of these safety items,
with the possible exception of seat
belts, had been negligible. In a classic
1975 paper in the Journal of Political
Economy, Sam Peltzman found that the
regulations’beneﬁt to vehicle occupants
had been completely offset by drivers
taking more risks that increased pedes-
trian deaths and nonfatal accidents.
Although subsequent research has
debated Peltzman’s ﬁnding,few analysts
question the existence of some offset.
Nor have researchers been able to show
that the market would not have intro-
duced these safety features once
motorists were willing to pay for them.
In a 1995 article in the Journal of Law
and Economics, Fred Mannering and I
concluded that automakers began wide-
ly offering air bags not because of gov-
ernment action, but because consumers
were ﬁnally willing to pay for their (less
costly) installation and more reliable
deployment. Supporters of government
regulation of auto safety often argue that
consumers have insufficient information
about the beneﬁts of safety devices. But
Mannering and I found that consumers
followed information about experiences
with air bags (most spectacularly, the
head-on collision near Culpeper,
Virginia, of two air bag–equipped
Chryslers whose drivers walked away
unhurt) as it spread through the media
and friends and were therefore increas-
ingly willing to pay for air bags. Once
the market accepted air bags, however,
government intervened to set a deploy-
ment standard for all air bags,thus delay-
ing improvements in technology.
Although the public has expressed
concern that deregulation of airlines,
railroads,and trucks might cause carriers
to sacriﬁce safety for short-term proﬁts,
intercity carriers have in fact become
much safer over the past few decades.
Government’s role in promoting that
safety, however, is debatable. The
National Civil Aviation Review
Commission, for example, has called for
the airline industry to increase self-regu-
lation instead of relying so heavily on
federal enforcement and safety rules.
The railroad industry maintains that
government regulations have had little
to do with its improved safety record.
And police crackdowns on truckers’dri-
ving violations have been much more
effective than any safety regulations.
Research and Development
Research and development may be pro-
hibitively expensive, and its beneﬁts
insufficient, for the private sector to
carry out. Government involvement
here is justiﬁed on the grounds that the
beneﬁts of the R&D investment it
undertakes—because the private sector
cannot or will not—spill over into large
parts of the economy.SUMMER 1999 45
But the history of government R&D
in transportation is not encouraging.
During the 1960s, Washington spent
nearly a billion dollars to jump-start
development of a supersonic commer-
cial airplane. When the project began,
the aircraft industry was expected to
bear 25 percent of the costs; in fact its
share was only 10 percent. Facing
mounting technical problems, rising
costs,and opposition by environmental-
ists and local airport authorities, the
federal government eventually aban-
doned the program.Left on its own,the
private sector went on to invest success-
fully in new ﬂeets of efficient wide-
bodied and short-haul jets, but not in
supersonic planes.
Now Washington has made $1 bil-
lion available to promote development
of high-speed ground transport,includ-
ing standard rail retroﬁtted for higher
speeds, new high-speed rail, and mag-
netic levitation (Maglev) transport.
States are also getting into the act.
California, Texas, and Florida, among
others, are considering high-speed rail
lines to link their major cities. A con-
gressionally mandated cost-beneﬁt
study, however, found that the net
beneﬁts from federal support of high-
speed ground transportation were nega-
tive. And with construction costs of
some $30 billion, the proposed bullet
train between San Diego and northern
California would also be hard pressed to
generate positive net beneﬁts.Whether
the public would be willing to under-
write these projects is highly uncertain.
Washington has also spent more
than $500 million—and has committed
another $1.3 billion over the next five
years—to develop an intelligent trans-
portation system that uses sophisticated
information technology to navigate
and even operate vehicles,thus improv-
ing both automobile safety and conges-
tion. Conservative estimates are that
fully developing a national system
could ultimately cost the government
more than $100 billion.Without com-
pelling and persuasive beneﬁt esti-
mates, it is hard to justify this sort of
megaspending when there are far less





any social scientists, including
some Nobel Prize winners, have
developed general theories of
government to explain why certain
policies are implemented and others are
not. Without drawing completely on
any one theory, the simplest answer to
why government repeatedly pursues
inefficient transportation policies is that
policymakers—appropriately—respond
more to political forces than to market
forces. Transportation policy has thus
become a giant grab bag whose beneﬁts
are available to various vested interests—
some just get more than others—at the
expense of a more efficient transporta-
tion system that could save the public at
large billions of dollars.And the costs of
government failures have soared because
the grab bag continues to grow.
To be sure, intercity transportation
deregulation prevailed over the objec-
tions of the trucking and airline indus-
tries and of transportation labor.
(Policymakers also tinkered with dereg-
ulation—unnecessarily, as it turned
out—to appease air travelers from small
communities, who feared they would
lose service,and rail shippers who might
be captive to one railroad and face exor-
bitant rates.) But intercity deregulation
is a rare case where a more efficient
transportation policy overcame the
resistance of entrenched interests.
The rest of the transportation system
continues to channel the public’s money
to vested interests. Remaining regulato-
ry regimes raise the proﬁts of airlines,
ocean carriers, ship builders, and taxi
owners; urban transit policy rewards
transit managers and labor as well as
suppliers of capital while subsidizing
transit patrons;infrastructure policy sub-
sidizes truckers, aviators, motorists, and
mariners;and government R&D spend-
ing beneﬁts consultants, engineering
companies,and so on.Social regulations
confer beneﬁts on and exact costs from
particular groups in disproportionate
measure. Noise regulation beneﬁts
homeowners but taxes air travelers and
airlines excessively; emissions and safety
regulations (partly) mollify environmen-
talists and safety advocates and beneﬁt
some of the public but cost automakers
and motorists more than necessary.
Can the government shift its habitu-
al focus from nurturing these political
interests to improving transportation
policy? In a 1998 Journal of Economic
Perspectives article Joseph Stiglitz assert-
ed that his effort, as chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, to
institute congestion pricing at airports
failed because general aviation (owners
of corporate jets and small planes) lob-
bied against reform and because the
government was unable to make a
credible commitment to compensate
them for the higher landing fees they
would have to pay. Perhaps. But I
would argue that the government could
credibly commit to building reliever
airports to accommodate general avia-
tion without sharply raising their land-
ing fees. The real stumbling block is
that the ﬂying public’s appreciation of
efficient takeoff and landing fees would
be mild at best.
Policymakers are capable of design-
ing mechanisms to compensate subsi-
dized interests (as they did to gain pas-
sage of intercity deregulation),but they
have no interest in doing so unless the
political payoffs are large. And it is
extremely difficult for the government
to implement efficient reforms.
Consider airport congestion fees. To
determine efficient charges, govern-
ment would have to get accurate esti-
mates of the value of passengers’ travel
time and of how long an aircraft’s take-
off and landing delays other aircraft (to
name just a few variables). Charges
would then have to be carefully
assessed for thousands of daily opera-
tions at a given airport and varied in
accordance with traffic ﬂows. In the
longer run,and even more challenging,
government would be expected to
reduce the delay caused by aircraft
operations—and thus lower congestion
fees—by building new runways and
implementing technological advances
to expand capacity.
In my view, government simply
lacks the appropriate economic incen-
tives and faces too many practical and
political constraints on its use of labor,46 BROOKINGS REVIEW
acquisition of technology, and so on to
implement even rough approximations
of efficient airport charges. (Imagine
the battles it would take just to reach a
consensus on an estimate for the value
of passengers’ time).The solution is for
government officials to approve the
policy’s goal and then allow the private
sector to achieve it—in this case, by
privatizing airports.
Excellent precedents exist for this
approach. For example, during the
1970s deregulation debates Congress
recognized that regulation had general-
ly elevated air fares above efficient lev-
els. But instead of giving the Civil
Aeronautics Board a detailed set of
guidelines on how to adjust fares to
make them more efficient,it deregulat-
ed the airline industry and allowed the
private sector to solve the problem.
Elected officials do have an incen-
tive to keep the costs of their failures as
low as possible.Why completely waste
resources that could be given to some
interest in return for political support?
Nonetheless, the inefficiencies that
government has created in the trans-
portation sector are large and will per-
sist as long as government continues to
provide service, regulate carriers, and
manage the infrastructure. We can
reduce them only if government cedes
to the private sector the responsibility




t is unreasonable to expect govern-
ment intervention in an imperfect
market to produce perfectly effi-
cient results. But government failures
in transportation have clearly imposed
costs that go beyond acceptable impre-
cisions in pursuit of correcting (possi-
ble) market failures. Similarly, it is
unreasonable to expect that allowing
the private sector a freer hand in trans-
portation will produce perfectly effi-
cient outcomes. But it is reasonable to
expect private markets to respond
effectively to potential market failures
and to expect that the cost of their
imperfections will be considerably less
than the cost of government failure.
Domestic Intercity and
International Transportation
Early critics of airline and railroad
deregulation maintained that small air-
line and railroad markets could not sup-
port competition.In fact,air travelers to
and from small communities have been
able to choose among carriers that offer
service with smaller (regional) jets,
while rail shippers who appear captive
to one railroad have the option of using
railroads that have formed a small system
or using another major railroad with
trackage rights over the “monopoly”
carrier’s track.Rail users can also beneﬁt
from source competition—for example,
Alabama utilities that face rate increases
on coal shipped from Colorado can
switch to coal from Kentucky if they
can access a different railroad—and from
product competition—for example,
utilities that face rate increases on natur-
al gas can shift to coal or oil if their
technology permits such substitution.To
be sure, a minority of air travelers and
rail shippers have limited competitive
options and face high prices—even
higher than those under regulation. But
this situation is often temporary.Air car-
riers,such as Southwest,do enter routes
dominated by one carrier, and shippers
can negotiate lower rates and better ser-
vice from a major railroad by,for exam-
ple, using a combined truck-rail opera-
tion that gives them access to a different
railroad as a bargaining chip.
Despite deregulation’s widespread
and ongoing beneﬁts and the market’s
ability to solve imperfections that arise
from time to time, some Washington
officials continue to bend to lobbying
efforts by particular interests. The
Department of Transportation drew up
competition guidelines partly in
response to claims by the Air Carrier
Association of America, the small, low-
fare carriers’ lobbying association, that
some large airlines have set predatory
prices. Travelers’ complaints of shoddy
service spurred Congress to consider a
“passengers’ bill of rights” that, among
other things, increases compensation to
passengers who are denied boarding.
But carriers’ alleged predatory behavior
has had little effect on travelers’ welfare,
and overbooking is a long-standing
industry practice,the threatened penalty
for which will only increase costs and
fares.The market has been and contin-
ues to be the best way to promote com-
petition and protect travelers against
carrier abuses.
Rather than meddling in a deregulat-
ed industry, federal policymakers should
be more aggressive in seeking to extend
the beneﬁts of domestic deregulation to
international airline markets and should
also open up the domestic air transporta-
tion market to foreign competitors.The
new Ocean Shipping Reform Act,
which allows importers and exporters to
negotiate individual, conﬁdential con-
tracts with ocean shipping lines, appears
to be a step in the right direction. But
further reform is needed because ship-
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federal antitrust laws and can still set
their rates collectively.
Urban Transit and Taxis
It is true that the federal government
got involved in urban transit during the
1960s because private transit failed. But
subsequent research has pointed out that
private bus operations had been serious-
ly hampered by government regulation.
Today, privatization is the only realistic
hope for paring the huge inefficiencies
accumulated in urban transit under pub-
lic management.
Just how would privatization make a
difference? Private bus and rail compa-
nies, competing vigorously with each
other and the private auto, would set
prices and service to maximize proﬁts.
Chad Shirley and I found that the eco-
nomic effects of such competition are
remarkably similar to the effects of effi-
cient pricing and service.Society would
gain from eliminating transit deﬁcits,
and the traveling public would gain
from more efficient, responsive, and
innovative services. As in intercity
deregulation, new entrants, such as jit-
neys and minibuses, would be key.Taxis
should also be deregulated as part of a
broader strategy to stimulate competi-
tion in urban transport. No longer
enjoying a secure niche between the
private car and the city bus or rail ser-
vice,taxis would be forced,for example,
to compete with vans that operate like
taxis and offer links with rail and bus
operations. The increased competition
and coordination in the new urban tran-
sit system should lower taxi fares,
improve service quality, and enable taxi
operations to impose some competitive
pressure on transit.
Critics of privatizing mass transit
often object that its beneﬁts would be
achieved only by redistributing income
from low- or ﬁxed-income travelers to
wealthier citizens. But, as noted, the
poor and elderly do not especially
beneﬁt from the current system of
ﬁnancing and providing mass transit. A
compelling example of the potential
beneﬁts of privatization for low-income
workers is the dollar-a-ride service in
the New York City borough of Queens.
Queens Van Plan, a private company
serving mostly low- to middle-income
minority workers whose neighborhoods
are neglected by public mass transit,pro-
vides an essential service and operates at
a proﬁt. Current regulations, however,
prevent the company from serving other
low-income areas of New York.Under a
privatized system, Queens Van Plan and
similar entrants would be free to expand
where the market demanded.
Federal policymakers should use
grants to encourage cities to run privati-
zation experiments.The experiments,of
course,would not be problem free.As in
intercity deregulation, service providers
and travelers would need time to adjust
to the new competitive order. And
although privatization is unlikely to cost
low-income travelers more in the long
run, short-term assurances—perhaps in
the form of transportation vouchers—
could help build support for the experi-
ments. But once experiments begin,
policymakers must allow competitive
markets to evolve and not micromanage
the transition.
Infrastructure
Although it would undoubtedly be a
challenge to enable the private sector to
curb the huge pricing, investment, and
production inefficiencies in public infra-
structure, it is possible to sketch how it
could be done.Many economists,myself
included, have resisted private sector
involvement and held out hope, for
example, that the public sector would
institute highway congestion pricing.
And there have been some promising
signs, such as the new high occupancy
toll (HOT) lanes in southern California
and Houston, where solo drivers can
pay a toll to use a less congested carpool
lane,and the successful congestion pric-
ing experiment on a private highway in
California’s Orange County. But a few
HOT lanes and congestion tolls on a
private highway are still light years from
a widely adopted congestion pricing
policy.And congestion pricing does not
address the massive inefficiencies in
building and maintaining roads and
bridges. In the case of airports, Boston
Logan did reduce congestion by increas-
ing landing fees for general aviation,but
Logan’s price increase was found to be
discriminatory—landing fees for larger
planes had been cut to keep the plan
revenue neutral—and it had to be
rescinded.
I have come to believe that infra-
structure inefficiencies will persist unless
managing authorities face some com-
petitive discipline.The limited evidence
bears me out: when private ﬁrms are
hired to perform highway maintenance,
collect tolls, and manage airports, cost
savings total 20–30 percent. New
Zealand is considering a bold ﬁrst step,
called commercialization, where the
government turns its roads over to com-
mercial road companies, which would
be expected to charge for their use and
earn a return on capital while being reg-
ulated as public utilities. Such a policy
would be problematic in the United
States, where government regulation of
public utilities is renowned for creating
inefficiencies. But pure privatization
raises the fundamental problem of a lack
of competitive options to curtail
monopoly abuses. Could that problem
be addressed? Suppose the government
distributes roads to commercial compa-
nies, as in commercialization, aiming to
allocate potentially competitive sections
(for example, California’s Highway 101
and Interstate 5) to different companies.
Private companies would be free to
establish their own investment and
maintenance policies, but they would
negotiate prices (long-term contracts)
with private local and state organiza-
tions representing motorists, truckers,
railroads, and private transit companies.
Government transportation would also
be represented by a bargaining organiza-
tion. Thus public and private users en
masse would be able to bring competi-
tive discipline on prices, and private
companies would have a ﬁnancial
incentive to minimize costs and provide
high-quality service.
Although such a scheme may seem
far-fetched, there is a growing reason
for considering something like it. As
noted, Washington has already spent
roughly $500 million and is committed
to spending far more on exploratory
plans for an intelligent transportation
system, which if fully developed would
ultimately cost hundreds of billions of48 BROOKINGS REVIEW
dollars. Such a system would call for
much greater public management of
highway travel and, if history is any
guide,add substantially to infrastructure
inefficiencies. Only the private sector
has the incentive and ability to develop
and hold down the costs of an intelli-
gent transportation system and maxi-
mize its life- and time-saving capabili-
ties. If Washington wants to move to a
new era of highway transportation, it
should give serious thought to allowing
the private sector to own and manage
the road system.
Similarly, the government should
increase the private sector’s presence in
air travel by privatizing airports and air
traffic control.As with private roads, pri-
vate airports and air traffic control would
negotiate user fees with commer-
cial and general aviation. Facing
competitive discipline from users
and alternative facilities, private
airports and air traffic control
would have an incentive to mini-
mize costs and provide high-qual-
ity and technologically up-to-date
service such as “free ﬂight,”which
enables pilots to choose their opti-
mum ﬂight patterns instead of
being crammed into the limited
number of FAA-deﬁned air
routes. More efficient use of air-
port and air space capacity would
also enhance airline competition.
Privatizing roads and airports
would also make it much easier to
introduce technologically current
aids to improve safety and to set
efficient prices for transportation
spillovers. Indeed, the substantial
improvement in automobile safety
should convince policymakers that their
periodic regulatory interventions would
have little value.As part of the privatiza-
tion contract, road companies would be
required to include a cost-based pollu-
tion tax and airports, a noise tax.
Inefficient federal regulations to curb
emissions and limit noise could then be
rescinded.
Finally, the government should with-
draw from the railroad business. Funds
for high-speed rail and subsidies for
Amtrak should be eliminated. Existing
and new modes should be forced to meet
the market test.If high-speed rail is com-
mercially viable, the private sector will
pursue it.If the only way Amtrak can stay
in business is by serving just the
Northeast corridor, then it should be
allowed to abandon service elsewhere.
WHAT WILL SPUR CHANGE?
T
he scholarly case for greater private
sector involvement in transportation
has been built slowly but broadly. In
the 1950s, John Meyer and his research
collaborators laid the intellectual founda-
tion for deregulating intercity transporta-
tion. Nearly 50 years later and despite
strong evidence, some policymakers still
need to be convinced that deregulation
has succeeded and can continue to suc-
ceed on its own.Subsequent research has
provided a basis for expanding the cause 
to deregulate international transportation
and taxis and, more recently, to privatize
transit and transportation infrastructure.
Based on the evidence reported here,
annual beneﬁts of some $50 billion would
be accrued from greater private sector
involvement in transportation. But that
ﬁgure greatly underestimates the potential
gains for two reasons. First, it fails to
account for ridding the system of trans-
portation-related costs that are hard to
quantify, such as bloated inventories and
urban sprawl.Second,it does not include
costs of government failure that become
clear only after deregulation or privatiza-
tion takes place.
Because policymakers beneﬁt from
business as usual,why would they consid-
er fundamental changes in policy to pur-
sue greater transportation efficiency?
Intercity deregulation became politically
attractive when the political beneﬁts to
policymakers from working in harness
with carriers and labor were over-
whelmed by the potential political gains
from reducing inﬂation. Similarly, the
probability of deregulating or privatizing
other areas of transportation will increase
if the prospect of major political gain
becomes clear.Unfortunately,it probably
won’t in the near future. Despite the
obvious beneﬁts for consumers, interna-
tional airline deregulation is moving
slowly, especially because carriers from
other countries are wary of competing
with U.S. carriers. U.S. transit subsi-
dies and infrastructure inefficiencies
are large and growing, but recent
successes in eliminating state and
federal budget deﬁcits have tem-
porarily eased pressure to cut waste-
ful spending on transportation. In
fact, recent federal legislation vastly
increases support for transit, high-
ways,and airports well into the next
century.
Eventually, the political cost of
sustaining large transportation
inefficiencies will spur change,but
policymakers must see the political
payoff from reducing these ineffi-
ciencies. And while the current
state of evidence strongly suggests
that any inefficiencies resulting
from further deregulation and pri-
vatization will not come close to the
cost of government failure, there are
clearly risks associated with these poli-
cies. Researchers can help ease policy-
makers’ fears by continuing to show
them the economic—and political—
beneﬁts of a more efficient U.S. trans-
portation system. They can also
demonstrate how these beneﬁts can be
achieved by deregulation and privati-
zation and how technological change
can facilitate competition—the key to
the success of deregulation and privati-
zation—in ways once unimaginable.
Policymakers will not forgo the
chance to increase the system’s effi-
ciency forever. n